Purpose of this Document

• An attempt to provide structure for upcoming discussion.
• Start of a potential living document to track the progress and results of our considerations.

Introduction

The focus of this activity should be at the neighborhood and community level, reaching up to the City government and down to multi-family groups.

1. Recognize that a large proportion of the community will not be prepared to survive on their own for 72-hours.
2. Recognize that there are many opportunities for emergency preparation and response that are not accessible to individual families.

I am going to use military analogies because war is an inherently chaotic situation, similar to emergencies and disasters. Additional, the analyses of successes and failures is vastly superior to what is found for corporate business. Since many of the professional emergency responders have military experience, the analogies and terminology may be useful. However, the use of analogies can impede discussions when some participants take them further than intended.
Caveat: I do not have a military background, but have spent a lot of time dealing with people who do. I see this as an advantage - I know enough to be able to extract some of the useful lessons without being overcommitted to the approach

I am breaking the problem down into four areas

1. Planning
2. Training
3. Command & Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
4. Logistics

Following earlier discussions on terminology, I will use disaster to apply to regional event that substantially disrupts much of the infrastructure, with the primary local example being a major earthquake. In contrast, an emergency is a much more limited event, such as flooding, a toxic release, or a large scale police event such as a dangerous person or animal. Because emergencies are limited in both time and area affected, the portions of Training and Logistics dealt with in this document are largely irrelevant: The emergency will be over before these are useful, and unaffected areas nearby can provide the needed skilled manpower and supplies.

A major constraint in preparing for a disaster is that equipment and procedures used only during a disaster have a very high failure rate

• Degrade in ways not detected by periodic testing
• Testing has failed to reveal that it doesn't scale up to what is needed in a disaster
• Unanticipated conditions in the disaster.
  Example: during the San Francisquito Creek flood, loudspeakers on the Fire Engines had greatly reduced effectiveness because they were mounted under the vehicle (in/near the water the truck was driving through)
• Lack of experience/training
  • Mistakes in operation
  • Slowness in operation because of uncertainty
  • Problems fixing or working around the inevitable problems
• Use rejected because people choose to use alternatives that they are more familiar with (confidence, ease of use,...)

Excluded

Family/Individual Preparation

There are existing organizations focusing on "Be prepared to on your own for 72 hours." There is no reason to become yet-another such organization, especially since such efforts are beyond the point of diminishing returns: They have already reached most of the people that are likely to be receptive. Despite the resources continuing to be poured into this activity, surveys show little change in the number of families that have taken these measures.

The argument that After Katrina, people will understand the importance of being prepared demonstrates an obliviousness to history. The very same statement was made after the Loma Prieta and Kobe earthquakes and after hurricanes Andrew (1992), Charley-Frances-Ivan (2004), Hugo (1989), etc.

CERT Activities

CERTs have their own organization and should conduct CERT business and discussions within that framework. They should not try to usurp these meetings and activities.

However, it is appropriate to discuss the structuring of tasks to be a better fit with what the CERTs are trained to do.
Caveat: We should not expect there to be an active CERT response in all sections of the city.

Phases: Prevention and Recovery

The terminology being used by Palo Alto for the phases of dealing with disasters is:

1. Prevention
2. Preparation
3. Response
4. Recovery

Planning

My favorite quote on planning comes from General Dwight Eisenhower about the preparations for D-Day: "Plans are useless, but planning is essential." This is a pithier summary of the advice of great strategist Moltke the Elder, Prussian Chief of the General Staff 1857-1888, that has been overly condensed as "No plan survives first contact with the enemy." Eisenhower—echoing Moltke—explained that intensively working through many different plans, and especially what could go wrong, allowed them to effectively adapt as problems arose: They knew which problems were critical, and which fixes were likely to be successful.

Our effort does not have the resources to engage in this sort of intensive planning effort. However, one way to acknowledge this lesson is to avoid the trap of putting too much effort and faith into "the plan." Instead, focus on having mini-plans (modules of a larger plan) that have maximum impact.

Action items:

1. Identify high-impact modules.
2. Identify the "Who will be doing what with which resources to whom."
   • What organizations have primary responsibility for which tasks
     • capabilities
     • intention/acceptance
     • stated commitment
   • Fail-over to secondary organizations
     • Types of failure: reduced capabilities, delayed response, ...
     • Handoff and resumption of responsibility
       • How does secondary organizations decide that they should take responsibility
       • Communication of handoff
       • How does primary organizations communicate that it can now take on its responsibilities, and manage the changeover
   • Example organizations: CERTs, Red Cross, Neighborhoods

Training

The current US military is not a good analogy — it is based on extensively and continuing training (troops on peace-keeping deployments suffer declining readiness). The better analogy goes back to World Wars I and II, which involved mass mobilizations. Various military historians ascribe German successes in the early period of these wars to the substantial superiority of their field manuals. These reference books provided "good enough" solutions to a wide range of key problems in a compact, usable format. Paraphrasing one of those historians (Keegan?), they kept enough of the quickly trained soldiers and junior officers alive long enough to acquire the experience and judgment to make more sophisticated decisions.

Training for disasters is an extreme version of this. Because disasters occur so infrequently, you need to assume that few people will have any training before the incident. During disaster response, some people will be able to engage in on-the-spot "book learning," but that most will learn indirectly.

It is critical to have "cheat sheets" for people to take with them: Trainees are not going to be able to get enough repetitions to accurately remember the lessons, especially since they are likely to be in a psychological state not conducive to retention of detail. Additional, well-structured notes will help them convey their new knowledge to additional people.

The requirements for most training is

• On-location - people cannot be sent to a training facility (no time to spare and travel will likely be difficult)
• Incremental, on-demand - learn what you need for the immediate task
• Quick, but good-enough: understand the limits of what you know; don't get in over your head

Action items:

1. Identify target skills for this type of training.
2. Find good training materials for these tasks (literature search).
3. Localize and otherwise customize individual chosen materials
4. Integrate components (e.g., resolve incompatibilities, add pointers).
5. Prepare for distribution after the disaster strikes.

Command&Control, Communications, Intelligence (C3I)

Around the mid-1980's, what had been three separate area were recognized as being so intertwined that they were increasingly treated as a unified whole.

C3I is critical to making effective use of your resources. In a war, the enemy's C3I is the primary target (first hit, and continuing high-priority target). Since your C3I is your enemy's primary target, you need to prepare for significant disruption.

In a disaster, the "enemy" is the event that has significantly damaged the local infrastructure. We should expect that it has badly damaged the normal communications network, that many of the decision-makers are unavailable (either victims or out of position), and that many of the emergency responders in the field are so overloaded with tasks that they cannot report back an adequate picture of overall conditions.

People new to this area often underestimate the difficult of data fusion - combining the various pieces of data from various sources to produce a composite description. For example, consider the simple case where the decision-maker receives two reports containing related statistics from two people in roughly the same area.

• Are these reports independent counts, overlapping counts, or is one a subsequent report to the other?
• If the last,
  • is the follow-up report
    • an update with cumulative statistics (update/correction), or
    • an incremental (additive)?
  • Is the first one received the first one sent?
• How reliable is the information?
• What is the scope of the report?
  Are the statistics for
  • a single block
  • a large neighborhood

Ambiguity of terminology is another likely problem. The word "casualty" is an example. For some, this is a synonym for "fatality", for others it means people injured but not killed, and for yet others, it covers both injured and killed. Since it is unrealistic to try to instruct people about "correct" usage, reporting templates should be designed with an eye to reducing opportunities for such confusions.

In emergencies and disasters, people often forget to communicate. For example, during the 2004-May-17 mountain lion sighting in Palo Alto, the police forgot to activate the emergency alerting system until long into the incident. The closer the communication system (who communicates with whom about what) is to that which is used in more common situations (normal business, minor emergencies,...), the more likely it is to be used in a disaster.

Action items:

1. Who - creating a resilient structure
2. What, When - what information to send up, down and sideways (neither too little or too much)
• Before the disaster
• At various stages during the response
3. How - form for both transmission and easily incorporation by the receiver

Logistics

"The battle is decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired." (Erwin Rommel, WW2 German General) Logistics is not just about anticipating what supplies will be needed and acquiring them, but

• knowing who needs what supplies and when
• moving those supplies to where they are needed

In a disaster, many of the needed supplies will already be present in the disaster zone. The problem is locating and recovering them and moving them to where they are needed. For example, much of the food in houses may go unused because they have no way to cook it.

For the purposes of disaster preparation and response, I am proposing an unconventional scoping to include three categories:

• Supplies
• Facilities
• Services

Action items:

1. Identify what shortages will impede effective response.
2. Identify what can have disproportionate positive impact on response.
3. Methods for locating and recovering in-area resources
4. Methods to facilitate aid arriving from outside

Appendix A

These appendices provide a first level elaboration of the major categories.

Appendix A.1: Planning - Major Categories

Appendix A.2: Training - Major Categories

• In the near-term aftermath of disaster, many opportunities for cooperation and joint activity between neighbors are missed.
  • people are rattled, and the obvious isn't
  • people are reluctant to make suggestions to neighbors who are nodding acquaintance for fear of being perceived as bossy or domineering
• ...

Appendix A3: C3I - Major Categories

Appendix A.4.1: Logistics - Supplies - Major Categories

1. Water - Potable
2. Water - Other
3. Fuel
4. Food
5. Electrical Power
   • Generators
   • Cleaner Power - Power from the typical generator is "dirty," beyond what many items of electronic equipment are designed to work with. Note: This does not mean that such equipment won't work: It may, it may not, or it may work with occasional failures and shortened lifespan.
   • Inverters for automobiles
     • Smaller electronic equipment, including laptop computers, can be run off the electrical system of automobiles.
     • Batteries for battery-powered devices can be recharged from car batteries
     • Support: prepare to get additional inverters from stores (Fry's, Auto Parts, ...)
     • Caveats: Difficulties with unattended charging
       • Modern auto batteries don't have the reserve capacity of batteries of yore
       • Many cars turn off the auxiliary power outlets ("cigarette lighter") when the ignition is off
6. Refrigeration
   • Medications
   • Extend usability of existing stock of food
   • Storage of copses
   • Other???
7. Inventory control/Classified Ads - registry
   • Who has supplies that are likely to be needed
   • Who has need for various supplies
   • Matches: direct people to source
   • Non-matches: announce the need
8. Finance - enabling a range of financial transactions so that people can purchase supplies
9. Medical Supplies

Appendix A.4.2: Logistics - Facilities - Major Categories

I strongly disagree with keeping the planned locations of disaster facilities secret until after the disaster strikes on the reasoning that you don't want people going to a location that is damaged or otherwise not open. While this may be a good policy for regional facilities (such as the New Orleans Convention Center during Katrina), it doesn't seem to make sense for first-level facilities

• Pre-announced locations are either functioning, or have a map of where people should go.
• Pre-announced locations give people a sense of what services will be available where. This applies not just to people needing help, but those able to provide help.

—

• Medical
  • Triage
  • First Aid
  • Staffing: likely to be retired doctors, nurses and volunteers with training. Active medical professionals are likely going to report to hospitals and other major medical centers.
• Food and Potable Water Distribution
• Distribution center
  • Food, Water
  • Contact with relief operations
    • Government (e.g., FEMA)
    • Private (e.g., Red Cross)

Appendix A.4.3: Logistics - Services - Major Categories

• Locator services
• Traffic Management
• Psychological support
• Labor - skilled
• Labor - unskilled
• News/Rumor Control
• Interface/mediation with relief agencies:
  One of the frustrating experiences of a disaster is standing in line for a day or more to get an appointment time to stand in line to deal with relief services. This is unnecessary and avoidable with some planning.
  Actions:
  • The city should be prepared to pressure the relief services to use the neighborhood groups to hand out blocks of appointment times.
  • The city should explore having relief services move from neighborhood to neighborhood, rather than having a central location.
• Liaison to National Guard

Appendix B

These appendices provide a first level elaboration of the major categories.

Appendix B.3: Command&Control, Communications, Intelligence

• Emergency Prep Form for initial database

Appendix B.3.2: C3I: Communications

HAM Radio

• Suitable for communication between City EOC and the CERT trailers and between the various CERT trailers
• Problem: Channel clutter: operators need to be experienced

FRS/GMRS Radio

Background:

• Being used by CERTs for communication between trailers and themselves
• Available in many electronics stores (e.g., Fry's Electronics, BestBuy)
• FRS does not require licenses. GMRS requires licenses ($55 application, $5/year), (but this requirement seems to be ignored by most users).

Actions:

• Arrangement with various merchants (e.g., Fry's Electronics, Radio Shack, ???)
  • Compensation
  • Updated location in store (for quick grab)
• Instructions for new operators
  • Usage
  • Call signs
  • ???

FM Radio - KZSU

Status (tasking, reliability, ...)

Low Power FM (LPFM) Radio

Background: Provides means to broadcast to residents who have normal battery powered radios. Range of 2-4 miles (one station might cover all of Palo Alto). Transmitters are relatively cheap (web search suggests a range of $400-3000).

Problem: Congress limited LPFM to rural areas at the behest of the big radio corporations (including NPR). Those corporations "invested" millions to obtain this decision (the National Association of Broadcasters alone purchased $2.2M of "access" to Congress). This all but squashed the movement. However, Congress' decision was so transparently corrupt (its rationale had been repeatedly disproved) that there was concern that Congress might reverse itself. Consequently, the big radio corporations engaged in a variety of tactics to lock up spectrum (translator stations were a favorite ploy). A moratorium was imposed, but is about to expire.

Problem: FCC listing shows no available frequencies in the Palo Alto area.

Tiny reason for hope: During Katrina, LPFM demonstrated utility - a station was set up outside the Houston Astrodome to keep the evacuatees there informed.

Problem: Normal LPFM licenses require routine broadcasting (5 hours per day?). Quick search of documents did not reveal any mechanism for reserving, or preempting, a frequency during an emergency.

Opportunity??: One use of LPFM is for traffic information on highways. I would expect that these broadcasts would be very useful during a disaster, but they may be off the air during a disaster if they haven't been designed for survivability (power and downloading messages).

Resources

• CERTs: Howard Zolty

Appendix B.4.1.0: Supplies - Generic - Arranging access

Example of Problem: During the aftermath of Katrina, news crews filmed police breaking in to convenience stores. Some reports suggested the police were looting (New Orleans police had reputation of substantial corruption), while others speculated that the police were getting food and water for themselves or the community (legitimate action).

Law enforcement does have the right to seize resources during an emergency, but disorganized operations raise questions about whether such seizures are authorized. Maintaining the credibility of law enforcement is critical to maintaining order during a disaster.

Goal: Create and implement process for obtaining access during a disaster to supplies at local commercial establishments.
Criteria:

• Allows for situations where owner/employees present, but does not depend on it (e.g., earthquake occurring outside business hours)
• Protection from abuse, for example, improper use of access to steal
• Appropriate compensation for owner

Potential Mechanism: Key Escrow for surrogate

In case disaster occurs when owner/employees not present, have keys available to designated surrogates.

• Mechanism: keys in tamper-proof sealed container
  • Provides security for store owner (Breaking of seal indicates abuse by surrogate)
  • Protects surrogate against accusations of unauthorized usage (if the seal is not broken)
  • Requires periodic checks that seals are intact
• Redundant escrow arrangement would be advantageous
• Surrogate should be chosen for availability and accessibility
  • city hall is bad choice -- likely to be inaccessible
  • Fire station may be acceptable with proper arrangements
    • Fire fighters are not likely to be present
    • This may be an appropriate task for the CERTs

Appendix B.4.1.1: Water - Potable

• Auxiliary city wells
  • Equipment needs
    • Pump and generator to lift water
    • Mediating/buffering/storage equipment - it is not practical to fill typical containers (1-5 gallon) from a large high-pressure pipe
  • Operation
    • Depend on locals - City Staff may not be able to reach area in time
    • Operating instructions
    • ??Volunteers who have practiced the procedures.??
    • Accessible (e.g., key to unlock)
    • Fuel source and priority - volunteers shouldn't have to fight with others (officials and individuals) over fuel

Appendix B.4.1.2: Water - Non-Potable

• Firefighting
• Hygiene
• ...

• Swimming Pools - maintain inventory
• Dams on creeks to create pools to draw water from
  • Potential dams - tubes that are filled with water (used as instant dikes for flood control)

Appendix B.4.1.3: Fuel - recovering local storage

• generators
  • public (e.g., water wells)
  • private (priority to ones being used in community activity)
• vehicles
  • public (police, fire,...) (although they supposedly have their own supply)
  • private (priority to ones used in relief activities)
• tools (e.g., chain saws)
• stoves and lanterns - camping stoves and lanterns that run on unleaded gasoline (usually as an alterative to white gas) are not uncommon

Local filling stations have large underground tanks, but how to recover?

• Prior arrangement for permission and compensation
• Arrangement for access (unlock)
• Pumping equipment
  • Electrical power for existing pumps wired to allow connection of generator (and disconnection from the grid)
  • Pumping directly from tanks
    • Equipment needed
• Storage vessels, dispensing scheme
• How to measure (for billing user and reimbursing owner)

Appendix B.4.1.4a: Food - grocery stores, restaurants

During a disaster, there is lots of food in grocery stores and restaurants, and typically it goes unused, with perishable spoiling.

Develop a recovery plan

• develop access plan (assuming earthquake)
  • Focus:
    • Perishables
    • Most usable (needs definitions)
  • identify likely safe and unsafe routes and areas
  • identify what level of inspection should be performed before attempting recovery of foodstuffs
  • prioritize what should be removed from building and identify location within store
  Problem: the main part of the store may be unsafe
  • large expanse of unsupported ceiling
  • products on floor
  • potential for more product to fall from shelves in an aftershock
  Many stores have a stockroom in the rear
  • smaller ceiling span
  • close to loading dock door (easy escape during aftershock)
  • product in large boxes
    • easier to carry out quickly
    • less clutter on floor (safety issue)
  • access to rear of refrigerated display (in many stores)
• Determine where to put foodstuffs removed
  • protection from elements
  • protection from theft/misappropriation
• Determining compensation for owner
• Who handles distribution of foodstuffs - almost certain to be a different group

Appendix B.4.1.4b: Food - shipped in

Problem: Shipment of food from warehouses outside the disaster area can be delayed by lack of request to ship. Warehouses don't know

• what is needed and
• if there is anyone to receive it

• Grocery store arrangement with warehouse: standing order
• Neighborhood/Red Cross provides
  • protected location to unload
  • volunteers to help manage "open-air" market
  • City/Red Cross provide guarantee of acceptance and reimbursement
    • truck will not be sent back to warehouse with its load
    • If planned site is unusable, truck will be redirected to nearby site that will handle selling of goods
  • Problem (big): establishing price lists
  • Problem (big): alternate forms of payment

Appendix B.4.1.5: Refrigeration

Arrange for refrigerated storage

• generator on store/restaurant refrigerators (capacity vs. power)
• refrigerated trucks (CITY Task)
  • contract with trucking firms
  • instruct grocery stores to try to retain any that are present (e.g., unloading) when the disaster strikes

Appendix B.4.3.1: Locator Service

Problem: Evacuation plans for commercial buildings have specified rally points for the occupants so that to make it easier to determine if anyone was left inside. A similar mechanism would be very useful during disaster response. It would enable rescuers to prioritize their efforts on locations where there are most likely to be victims, by first using the known survivors (for elimination) and then the unaccounted-for.

Problem: Families that are separated spend a great deal of effort to re-unite, often taking serious risks and clogging roads needed for emergency vehicles. This movement can be reduced and delayed if people can reliably get "I'm all right" messages to each other.

Example: Katrina: The locator service was started much too late, and by then many people had been evacuated long distances and didn't get entered into the database until days, weeks or even months later.

Example: Agnes flood (1972): In an area with roughly half the population of Palo Alto (Corning NY), the local radio station spent a significant portion (one-third?) of its broadcast on announcements of where people were and on who was being sought. After a week, this started to taper off.

Problem: The advice for individual families to have an out-of-area contact to check in with does not help non-family members attempting to determine whether there is a need to search/rescue members of that family.

Issue: The Red Cross' system seems to be focused on people who have evacuated the disaster area, not those who have been displaced within the disaster area. This is probably part technology (power and network access) and partly staffing.

Suggestion: Survey forms for emergency preparation should ask for the out-of-area telephone contact number for the family, providing another source of information about survivors/victims. This may also have the side-effect of encouraging people to establish such a number.

Requirements:

• System that allows virtually immediate roll-out after disaster strikes.
  "System" does not mean that it has to be the same implementation throughout, but rather data gathered in the early phases of the disaster should transition into subsequent versions of the system. For example, during the initial phase, information may be collected on paper forms that will be entered later into a computerized database. You don't want to have this original information rejected/discarded because of issues such as lacking appropriate authentication.
• Component info
  • Status: survived, injured, missing,...
  • Current location/contact info
• Reliability/authentication info for each entry
  • Date of entry
  • Source of information
  • Reliability of information: much of the useful information cannot be absolutely confirmed, but you don't want to have to pretend otherwise.
    Examples of problems:
    • The Jones report that they believe that their neighbors, the Smiths, survived because they saw the Smith's car in the driveway just before the quake and later they saw it was gone (inferring that the Smith had gone elsewhere)

Appendix B.4.3.2: Traffic Management

Problem: In a major disaster, we should expect to not have functioning traffic lights (electric power failure but damage to individual lights) plus having damage to major streets that requires detours.

Misleading experience: In the Loma Prieta earthquake, most of Palo Alto had electrical power restored by the next morning and only trivial damage to the local road network. Consequently, we didn't experience the chaos from this problem.

In a full fledged disaster, treating each intersection with a non-functioning traffic light as an all-way stop (as specified by California Vehicle Code) will not suffice - the cumulative delays will be overwhelming.

I believe that professional emergency responders are overly optimistic about clearing enough traffic off the roads to allow emergency responders to get through - There will be a massive number of people trying to get home and reunite with their families.

Additionally, the need for traffic control extends for days. If you have lost a significant portion of your major routes, the remaining ones are going to needed to move relief supplies and personnel into the areas. Remember that you can lose streets to many causes: damaged bridges/overpasses affect both the crossing road and the one being crossed, building collapse onto streets, broken water mains eroding streets, liquifaction, landslides, ...

Note: (2011) Current disaster plans designate El Camino Real as the first route to be cleared because it has the fewest number of over/under passes that could block the road.

• Restricted routes for emergency vehicles and relief supplies: control access as well as direct traffic
• Congestion relief on unrestricted streets to keep emergency vehicles from being delayed

• Labor - massive amount - exhausting work
• Instruction
• Safety vests: Bicycle or jogger vests (previously hunter's vests)
• Hand illuminators: reflectors, colored rags,...
• Materials to create "Safety Island"
  • Problem:
    • Normal lane configurations don't provide for a human traffic director.
    • In many places, the lane markings influence vehicles to pass too close to the person directing traffic
    • The "respect" that drivers show for a police officer directing traffic cannot be expected when it is a non-uniformed person.
  • Solution: created a safety zone through a combination of visual effects and physical obstacles
    • Visual effects:
      • Cones, e.g., soccer cones (with weight added to keep them in place)
    • Physical obstacles:
      • Sandbags: In the Agnes Flood (1972), we had a ready supply of filled sandbags (the waters quickly receded). A circle created by intermittent sandbags created a combination physical obstacle and visual effect. Two layers of sandbags were a significant barrier.

Appendix B.4.3.3: Psychological support

Experience: Agnes flood (1972): For months after the flood, whenever it even started to drizzle, small children would become panicked and hysterical. Giving tranquilizers to small children (4-10 years) became common, even though people were very uncomfortable about it.

Experience: Katrina (2005): Information now emerging (early 2006). Problems similar to earlier major disasters are being reported. Need to look for reports of successes, failures and lessons-learned of programs to reduce these problems.

Standing around with no news and nothing to do enforces the sense of isolation and helplessness created by the collapse of infrastructure.

• Encourage people to keep busy - suggest useful tasks
• Encourage people to work together - Prepare a list of ways for neighbors to help each other. A resident can then use this list to approach others and say "They suggest we do X. Do you think it is a good idea?"
  • people are rattled, and the obvious isn't
  • people are reluctant to make suggestions to neighbors who are nodding acquaintances for fear of being perceived as bossy or domineering
• Find suitable tasks for children, even if it is make-work.
  Children appear to be especially vulnerable.

Suggestion: Team with neighbors, friends, others

• Larger crew makes work goes faster
• Extra people to give a hand when something unexpected happens
• Easier to "keep a stiff upper lip" when others present
  • very easy to get depressed over damage and loss
  • keep moving forward

Appendix B.4.3.6: News/Rumor Control

Problem: Much of current printing technology assumes photocopying and photocopying requires substantial electric power. Alternate reproduction capabilities needed.

Requirements:

• Create a distribution network:
  • labor will be easy to recruit
  • Prepare (before disaster): maps for walking routes

Appendix B.4.x: Finance

Ancient history (for inspiration): Agnes flood (1972), Corning NY: The area's dominant employer (Corning Glass Works) initially issued script. Within a few days, they had massive amounts of cash shipped in and started disbursing it to workers:

• If you had a recent pay stub, you could get your weekly pay, rounded off to the nearest $20.
• Since the flood struck in the middle of the night, many people didn't have access to pay stubs. However, if you had an employee id, you could get a fixed amount (set at typical factory worker pay).
• Those who didn't have an id could be vouched for by someone who did.

Problem: Credit cards, debit cards, and ATMs are critically dependent on the telephone network (traditional, DSL, ...) to approve transactions, and the terminals that connect to the phone lines require electricity.

Requirements:

• Large infusion of cash to ameliorate break-down of electronic transactions.
  • Use Cash-Advance feature of credit cards to disburse?
  • Disbursement centers with good network connection (for authentication), either by satellite or major Internet node
• ??Preparation for credit card companies to relax authentication of transactions??
• Alternate practices for commercial establishments: partly how-to, partly encouragement and confidence building for alternate practices

Appendix B.4.x: Medical Supplies

Large overlap with Food:

• Similar issues for obtaining.
• Most grocery stores have small pharmacy; most drug stores carry some food products.

Prescription:

• Medication for new injuries (e.g., antibiotics)
• Prescriptions that have run out, or where they are inaccessible (e.g., in collapsed buildings)
  How to authenticate? Short-term work-arounds?

OTC medication: - sharing is more practical than for prescriptions

• New needs
• Existing needs

Other medical supplies

• First aid supplies: for example
  • Bandages (major and minor)
  • Antibiotics
  • Antiseptics (alcohol, peroxide, ...)
• Braces (for injured joint and limbs)
• Crutches, wheel chairs

Appendix B.4.x: Liaison with National Guard

The National Guard is a critical portion of relief operations. However, because they are trained as soldiers, they can easily create the impression of an occupying force, especially when supplementing the police.

Personal experience, Agnes flood (1972): The National Guard helicopters arrived shortly after day break during the flood and were invaluable in rescuing trapped people, and National Guard truck convoys carrying supplies started arriving within a couple of days. However, National Guard "boots on the ground" didn't arrive until the end of the first week.

On the first day they were present, I was coming home from yet another full day working cleanup. I was stopped at a checkpoint three blocks from home by a soldier with his automatic rifle at the ready. He all but pointed the rifle at me, even though there had been no problems in the area and I was following his instructions. He barked commands and questions at me.

I left the checkpoint with real anger. Part of that was that I was a typical territorial male, a territoriality that becomes stronger during times of stress: He was a stranger on my turf, ordering me around like I was slime. Part of it was that he hadn't "paid his dues." I hadn't had a shower since the flood. My clothes were caked with mud and sweat. I hadn't had warm food - the food kitchens were too far from where I was working. My muscles ached. My arms were burned from holding filing cabinets while they were being cut open with a torch. And he was standing there in a clean uniform that looked to still have creases, hassling people who were doing the real recovery work. (Note: checkpoints do become advisable at roughly this point in a disaster, anticipating the descent of gawkers and crooks).

Television, Katrina (2005): Many of the pictures showed military units acting as if they were scouting hostile territory, even when moving through neighborhoods far from those where there had been gunfire. A group of four soldier in full body armor with their automatic rifles moving in a loose diamond formation (covering front, back and both sides) does not say "We're here to help."

Suggestions: Be aware of these tendencies and try to match National Guard to appropriate tasks. Assign local liaisons to significant groups.

Appendix C

These appendices provide outlines for documents.

Appendix C.x - Prolonging perishables

• Don't prematurely open refrigerators and freezers -- preserve cold storage
• Multi-family kitchens - Collaborate with neighbors to make better use of resource
  • Use perishable food first
  • Phased opening of refrigerators - Share each family's refrigerator contents in turn
  • Psychological: more like a party than a disaster, also reduce sense of isolation

Appendix C.x - Damage Assessment

• Check and mark houses near you
  • Conventions for marking and reporting results needs to be made public
  • Information
    • Checked when and by whom
    • Level of check (vocal, cursory, full search,...)
  • Who to report to?
• Infrastructure damage
  • Electrical: main and hookups to houses
  • Gas
  • Water
  • Streets
  • How to mark
  • Who to report to?
• Cumulative information needs
  • Emergency needs
  • Rough damage assessment - for planning next steps in response
  • Damaged building needing inspection

Appendix C.x - Work teams

• Location tracking
  • Reasons
    • need to locate equipment they are using for higher priority task
    • need to locate member
      • personal reasons
      • expertise
  • Schemes
    • use children as couriers to update your location with central clearinghouse
    • have "banner" on street and easily visible from corners so someone searching for you can more easily spot you.
      • Example banner: bright sweatshirt on pole in scarecrow configuration with additional info to distinguish you from other groups with similar color banner.

Appendix C.x - Child Care

• Parents are freaked. Rubs off on children. Less stress if children are focused on something else (e.g., play)
• Children out from underfoot during cleanup
  • safety for child
  • safety for parents -- one less thing to keep track of
• Organize as co-op of a cluster of neighbors
  • senior citizens may be good resource
  • means of participation
  • "trade" child care for help in cleaning up their house

Appendix C.x - Entering damaged buildings (when necessary)

• Use commonsense about whether or not it is likely to be safe (err on the side of caution)
• Be prepared for delayed collapsing or an aftershock doing additional damage
  • carry whistle (help rescuers find you) and small flashlight
  • always leave someone outside with a list of the team
    • list by name _and_ description
    • don't want subsequent rescuers to leave one of you behind (they might count one of the original victims as one of your team)
    • useful function for those who are not best choice for going inside (e.g., elderly, small adults, "the clumsy",...)
  • have a safe path for getting out if trouble develops
    • each time you move into a new area in the building, rethink your escape path, and get it planted firmly in your mind
    • check that it won't be blocked by things falling
    • consider whether rubble and fallen objects will impede your getting out
    • in case your primary escape path becomes blocked, also have alternative paths in mind
  • minimize your time inside by thinking first about what you are likely to need to do and what supplies you will need
    • tape, string, rope
    • trash bags, carry bags, buckets, broom
    • tools (hammer, pry bar, screwdriver, knife,...)
  • prioritize your activities for maximal impact
    • retrieve things you have immediate need for
    • prevent/reduce future damage
      • secure items that might fall in aftershock
        • put on floor
        • tie or tape cabinets shut (so nothing else will fall out). Do not spend time trying to get breakables out of cabinets -- this is typically a slow process and should be done later in the cleanup process
    • cleanup spills and broken items that could cause additional damage
    • postponing cleaning up things that are unlikely to get worse and unlikely to cause safety problems for you

Appendix C.x - Intra-neighborhood communication

• Mechanism: "Tikes on Bikes"
  • send in groups of 2 or more
    • help each other if trouble
    • peers to talk to/play with during idle time
  • all messages are written (don't trust their memory)
  • maps
  • give them a way of participating without exposing them to undue danger